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CONFLICT AT THE CONFLUENCE:
THE STRUGGLE OVER FEDERAL
FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT
STEVEN E. EHLMANN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Flooding on the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers in 1993 and 1995,
followed by flooding on the Red River of the north in 1997, have
directed national attention to the issue of floodplain management. This
article will review the history and state of floodplain policy in St. Charles
County, Missouri, and, more particularly, that area of the county governed by the Consolidated North County Levee District and located at
the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers. This area, wedged
between two of the great rivers of the world, has some of the best farmland in the United States and has experienced three major floods between 1986 and 1995. This article will examine federal floodplain
policy not only on its face but also as applied to this particular area.
II.

HISTORY OF FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT

By the early 1900s, the United States Army Corps of Engineers had
begun constructing flood control projects in the Mississippi Valley. I In
the bootheel region of Missouri, the same engineers who had dug the
Panama Canal worked to drain hundreds of thousands of acres of swamp
and build levees to protect the area from flooding of the Mississippi
River. 2 The massive flood on the Mississippi in 1927 led to increased
involvement by the federal government. 3 The United States Army Corps
* Steven E. Ehlmann is a state senator from St. Charles County, Missouri. He is in his sixth year
in the Missouri Senate and serves as Republican Floor Leader. He is a practicing attorney with the
firm of Pelikan, Ehlmann, and Guinness, P.C. He received his B.A. degree from Furman University,
his M.A. in history from the University of Missouri-Columbia, and his J.D. from Washington University
in St. Louis. I would like to thank my legislative aide, Scott Buehler, for his research assistance.
1. Floyd C. Shoemaker, Kennett: Center of a Land Reborn in Missouri's Valley of the Nile, 52 Mo.
HIsT. REV. 99, 106-07 (1958); DUANE MEYER, THE H ERITAGE OF MISSOURI-A H ISTORY 456 (1963).

In

1905, the Missouri legislature authorized the establishment of the Little River Drainage District, one of
the nation's largest such projects, covering 500,000 acres reaching from the foothills just south of
Cape Girardeau, Missouri, to the Arkansas border and including parts of seven counties. Shoemaker,
supra. Due to the drainage project, the population of this area jumped from 21,706 in 1900, to 45,329
in 1950. Id. at 107. From a valuation of only a little over $2 million in 1890, the counties' valuation
rose to over $39 million in 1955. Id.
2. MEYER, supra note 1, at 456.
3. JOHN M. B ARRY, RtsING T IDE-THE GREAT M ississiPPi FLOOD OF 1927 AND How IT CHANGED

AMERICA 399 (1997). The flood of 1927 covered an area the size of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New
Hampshire, and Vermont combined and stretched from Illinois to the Gulf of Mexico; over one million
people were forced out of their homes. Id. at 21.
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of Engineers built $8 billion worth of levees, dams, and channels along
the lower Mississippi River south of St. Louis. 4 In contrast, the upper
Mississippi remained a patchwork of private and local levees. 5 The
Flood Control Act of 1936 broadened the Corps' authority to build
flood control projects nationwide, and, over the next two decades, several
billion dollars were spent for that purpose. 6
III. THE ST. CHARLES EXPERIENCE
By the 1940s, smaller federal projects were proposed along the
upper Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. 7 One, which came to be known
as the "L-15 Project," would have protected the floodplain area in St.
Charles County, Missouri, at the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers. 8 The L-15 project was proposed after a series of floods
in the 1940s and 1950s. 9 After the Corps of Engineers finished Lock
and Dam 26 in Alton, Illinois, there followed, within the next fifteen
years, four major floods.10 There had been no major floods for the
previous fifty years, and. coming as they did after the completion of the
dam, these floods were perceived by many as human-made." Whatever
the reality, it is important to appreciate that the people who had farmed
the floodplain had this perception. It would influence a later generation's response to floodplain management.
Several flood studies were done during the 1960s. In fact, a federal
levee project was very close to being funded until budgetary constraints
in 1972, caused by the Vietnam War, canceled the project.' 2 The 1973
4. Judith Basehore Alef, The Rise and Fall of the MississippiRiver: The CulturalPolitics of Land
Development (visited Mar. 19, 1998) <http://www.teleport.com/-orlo/be4/features/AfterFlood.html>.
5. Id.
6. Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Program and Louisiana, 60
TUL. L. REV. 61, 65 (1985). The only requirement was that "the benefits to whomsoever they may
accrue are in excess of the estimated costs and that the lives and social security of the people are
otherwise adversely affected." 33 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1936).
7. Interview with Ray Machens, President of the Consolidated North County Levee District, in St.
Charles, Mo. (Jan. 12, 1998). Ray Machens has served as President of the levee district since its formation. For many years prior to that, he served on one of the predecessors to the consolidated levee
.............
activ, ia ,evee
affairs iiuougihu his iife. His famiiy has farmed in the floodplain
for over 100 years and he has dealt with various federal agencies regarding floodplain management.
8. id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Lock and Dam 26 was completed at Alton, Illinois, in 1937. The Dam, built to aid
navigation on the Mississippi, created Alton Lake. The lake became and remains a recreational area.
11. Id.
12. Id. Congressman William Hungate (D-Mo.) was able toget a $140,000 appropriation for the
North County Levee District to make possible the preparation of a comprehensive environmental
impact statement and a study on the L-15 project. 118 Cong. Rec. H5786 (daily ed. June 20, 1972)
(statement of Rep. Hungate). The Vietnam War caused interest rates to rise. In response, the House
of Representatives passed H.R. 10203 on October 12, 1973, which would have frozen the interest
rates at the 1968 level for the L-15 project. The bill never became law and the L-15 project did not
proceed.
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flood on the Mississippi River led to another big push for the project.13
There had developed in the interval an additional problem with the
cost-benefit formula. To be approved, the benefits derived from the project had to exceed the costs of construction. Floodplain regulations
adopted by St. Charles County in 1978 had imposed floodways along
the river where no structures, including levees, could be built. As a result
of these regulations, any attempt to raise the levees would require that
they be moved back from both the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers;
leaving less land protected, and thus, diminishing the cost-benefit
ratios. 14 In November of 1987, the Corps of Engineers finally closed the
book on the L-15 project and declared that the project definitely would
not be built.t 5
The decision could not have come at a worse time. The flood of
1986 devastated the area, and since it came in October, many crops were
lost. Previous amendments to Public Law 84-99, the rehabilitation
program for damaged levees, were an additional blow.16 First, federal
law required that all levees must have public sponsorship to be eligible
for rehabilitation assistance. 17 Second, the local public entity had to
contribute twenty percent of the cost of repairing the levees.1 8 While the
first of these requirements was not yet in effect, the twenty percent
funding was a big problem.19 Ultimately, the people of the area had to
13. Interview with Ray Machens, President of the Consolidated North County Levee District, in
St. Charles, Mo. (Jan. 12, 1998).
14. Id. In 1967, the local farmers had formed the North County Levee District under Chapter
245, RSMo., but had stopped short of asking the court to approve a plan of reclamation and actually
building a levee at their own expense. Id. The district did not proceed for two reasons. Id. First, they
were relying upon the federal promises to build the L- 15 project. Id. Second, the Corps of Engineers
had the authority and the money to repair damaged levees after a flood. Id. The agricultural
community had become totally reliant and dependent upon the federal government to build and pay the
entire cost of repair to all public and private levees after floods. Id.
15. Id.

16.

FARM LAW-MO. BAR-CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, UPDATE

S-3, § 15.4 LEVEES

AND DRAINAGE

DISTRiCTS (Dec. 1990).
17. Id.
18. Id.
In order to qualify for public sponsorship a levee system or organization must be one of
the following: (a) legal subdivision of state government; (b) local unit of government
such as a city or county; or (c) state charter organization such as a levee board. The St.
Louis District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers indicated that a drainage or levee
district organized under state law had to submit to it a copy of the court order or other
papers documenting such incorporation of such an entity to verify that it was, indeed,
eligible for the rehabilitation program.
Id.
19. Interview with Ray Machens, President of the Consolidated North County Levee District, in
St. Charles, Mo. (Jan. 12, 1998). Although two levee districts were in existence, the largest had never
asked the circuit court to approve its plan of reclamation, and thus, no benefits had been assessed. Id.
A smaller district, the Cul-de-Sac Levee District had been set up in 1917 but had been inactive for 30
years. Id. Up to that point, the federal government had been taking care of levees and there was no
need for levee districts to worry about levee repairs. Id.
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rely upon voluntary donations from property owners to raise the money
to repair the damaged Missouri River levee. 2 0 Large sections of an
abandoned railway embankment, which provided levee protection for
several miles along the Missouri River near St. Charles, were no longer
maintained by the railroad and also had to be repaired. 2 1
With the levees rebuilt, but the L-15 Project dead, local leaders took
action. First, they consolidated the existing circuit court levee districts
into a single district. 2 2 The consolidated district then filed a plan of
reclamation, which was approved by the Circuit Court of St. Charles
County, and prepared to float a $2.5 million bond issue to finance the
improvements. 23 The local leaders were determined that if the federal
government would not build a levee, they would build it themselves.
What the board of supervisors did not realize was that in the preceding decades, the federal government had passed laws and established
regulations that made it nearly impossible to raise the existing levees
in this area of St. Charles County. 24 The first hurdle to overcome was
20. id. The boards of the two levee districts sent out letters to all the landowners in the districts.
Id. Everyone was asked to contribute two dollars per acre. Id. Many did, but there were many who
contributed nothing. Id. Large donations were obtained from McDonnell Douglas which had a
facility in the levee district that had been forced to shut down for two days during the 1986 flood. Id.
Another large contribution came from Union Electric, whose power plant in Portage des Sioux,
Missouri, had been cut off and its workers had been forced to come to work in a barge during the
flood. Id. Without the cooperation of these two corporate citizens, there would have been insufficient
revenue to rebuild the levees since there was no mechanism to force payment of any assessment. Id.
21. The embankment belonged to the Missouri Kansas Texas (KATY) Railroad and had been
abandoned pursuant to the federal Rails to Trails Act just prior to the flood. In the past, the railroad
had always come in immediately, after any flood, to repair any damage to its embankment. It was
necessary for the railroad to make such repairs to restore usage of the track. Also, the railroad's
easements for right-of-way required that they "maintain the embankment." The Missouri Department
of Natural Resources took over possession of the property pursuant to the Rails to Trails Act. The
levee district eventually entered into a license agreement with the Department of Natural Resources
allowing them to use the embankment for levee purposes. The levee district eventually turned the
railroad embankment into a levee, to meet the standards of the Corps of Engineers.
22. Plan of Consolidation, the Consolidated North County Levee District, No. CV187-2697CC
(Cir. 11. July 10, 1987) (Order granting consolidation). On July 10, 1987, the court approved the
consolidation of the North County Levee District and the Cul-de-Sac Levee District, Inc., into the
Consolidated North County Levee District. The levee district stretched from the city limits of St.
Charles, Missouri, on the Missouri River, down to the confluence and back up the Mississippi River to
-= Of Poage des SiouA, Missouri. The levee provides protection for approximately 30,000
-ups
acres of farmland and associated improvements in the Missouri River and Mississippi River
floodplains. Total levee alignment under the maintenance of the levee district is approximately 34.5
miles in length.
23. Id. (Order granting Plan of Reclamation signed on Mar. 19, 1990).
24. UNITED S TATES CORPS OF ENGINEERS, HYDRAULIC INVESTIGATION MISSOURI RIVER LEVEE HEIGHT
AND ALIGNMENT ST. CHARLES COUNTY, MISSOURi 1-2 (1990).
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Section 404 of the federal Clean Water Act.25 It took the district nearly
two years and $40,000 to get a 404 wetland permit from the Corps of
Engineers. 26 The second hurdle would prove even higher. In 1978, the
federal government had persuaded St. Charles County to enter the Na27
tional Flood Insurance Program and to adopt floodplain regulations.
IV. THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
A. HISTORY OF THE NFIP
In the wake of massive flooding in Kansas and Missouri in 1951
and 1952, President Truman recommended a federally subsidized flood
insurance program which Congress chose not to pass at that time.2 8 In
1965, Congress directed the Federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to prepare a report recommending flood insurance
as part of a mix of structural and disaster relief measures. 29 A separate
task force recommended a flood insurance program with the following
prophetic warning: "A flood insurance program is a tool which should
be used expertly or not at all. Correctly applied it could promote wise
use of floodplains. Incorrectly applied it would exacerbate the whole
problem of flood losses." 30
The National Flood Insurance Act became law in August of 1968.31
In 1973, Congress passed another Flood Disaster Protection Act and
found that flood losses were increasing "largely as a result of the accelerating development of, and concentration of population in, areas of
flood and mud slide hazards. This development was being encouraged
25. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988).
Section 404 requires permits for placing "pollutants" in the "waters of the United States," sets forth a
far broader federal interest and expands the scope of federal regulation beyond "navigable waters" to
include all "waters of the United States." Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d
79 (2nd Cir. 1975). This includes "adjacent wetlands." 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1996). In determining
whether to issue a permit for levee development the Corps must conduct a public interest review and
comply with statutory guidelines. 40 C.F.R. § 230 (1996).
26. Interview with Ray Machens, President of the Consolidated North County Levee District in
St. Charles, Mo. (Jan. 12, 1998). In addition to all of the normal engineering expense, the levee district
was forced to do an archeological study in the area near Portage des Sioux, Missouri. Id. As the
name implies, Portage des Sioux was the point at which the Sioux Indians would leave the Mississippi
River and carry their canoes across the narrow isthmus to the Missouri River to avoid some 30 miles of
paddling. Indian artifacts, including many arrowheads, are abundant in the area. The levee district
spent nearly $20,000 to pay an archeologist to map the area so that it could proceed with the levee. It
was also required to plant species of endangered plants in the area where the levee construction was
conducted and to mitigate several acres of land to make up for the area where the levee was widened.
33 U.S.C. § 125 (1994).
27. ST. CHARLES COUNTY, Mo., REV. ORDINANCES § 5 (1993).
28. Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance Programin Louisiana,60 TUL.
L. REV. 61, 67 (1985).
29. Id. at 68.
30. Id. at 69 (citing H.R. Doc. No. 89-465, at 3-8 (1966)).
31. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 1340, 42 U.S.C. § 4012 (1982).
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by federal agencies and by the availability of federally insured loans,
grants and guarantees for land acquisition and construction in floodplain
areas."32
To remedy this problem, Congress added another federal flood
insurance program to provide federally subsidized insurance where the
private market was too smart to go. 3 3 Federal assistance, including
assistance from federally insured lending institutions, for construction in
flood prone areas was made contingent upon the purchase of flood insurance, the availability of which was dependent upon community participation in the flood insurance program. 34 The federal government enforced its will by providing the carrot (flood insurance) to get each local
entity to use the stick (floodplain ordinances), which greatly restricted
the ability to build or develop in the floodplain.
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which will celebrate
its thirtieth birthday this year, is presently administered by the Federal
Insurance Administration (FIA) of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) in Washington, D.C., and through ten regional offices
throughout the country. 35 The NFIP's ultimate success depends upon
the adoption of floodplain management ordinances in each community
in every state. 36
B.

THE PROGRAM

A community applies for participation in the NFIP either because of
interest in eligibility for flood insurance or because it has received notifi37
cation from FEMA that it contains one or more flood hazard areas.
After the adoption by a community of resolutions or ordinances to minimally regulate new construction in flood hazard areas, FEMA authorizes
the sale of flood insurance in the community up to the Emergency
Program limits. 3 8 FEMA assesses the degree of flood risk and development potential and arranges for a study of the community to determine
base flood elevations (BFEs) and flood risk zones. Communities with
32. Houck. sunra note 28, at 70 (citing Pub. L. 'No. 93-234, 87 Star. 975).
33. Id. at 71 (citing AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, STUDIES ON FLOOD AND FLOOD DAMAGE
1952-55 3 (1956)). The insurance industry published a series of reports in the 1950s which concluded
that because of the high risks involved, private insurance against flood losses could not be
underwritten successfully.
34. Id. at 71.
35. Id. at 73.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 73-74.
38. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 44 C.F.R. § 361.6 (1996). The emergency program's flood insurance coverages are: single family buildings-$35,000; other residential buildings$100,000; non-residential buildings-$100,000; residential contents-$10,000; and non-residential
contents-$100,000.
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minimal or no flood risk are converted to the Regular Program without a
study.

39

FEMA provides the studied community with a Flood Insurance Rate
Map and a Flood Hazard Boundary Map delineating BFEs and flood
risk zones. The community is given six months to adopt this information as part of its local zoning and building code ordinances. 4 0 After the
community adopts more stringent ordinances provided by FEMA, it is
4
converted to the NFIP's Regular Program. 1
Once in the Regular Program, FEMA authorizes the sale of additional flood insurance in the community up to the Regular Program limits,
and the community implements the floodplain management measures it
42
has adopted. Having tasted the carrot, citizens now must feel the stick.
FEMA arranges for "periodic community assistance visits" with local
officials to, as their literature suggests, provide technical assistance re43
garding compliance with NFIP floodplain management requirements.
These visits may be routine in communities with a long history of
zoning. However, in agricultural communities, which often have little or
no zoning experience, the FEMA8'officials often seem more like inquisitors than federal bureaucrats that are "here to help." A bad visit
from FEMA can result in the community being put on suspension, and
ultimately being expelled from the NFIP. 4 4 The mere threat of such
39. Id. The Base Flood Elevation is the elevation of the flood with a 1% chance of being equaled
or exceeded in any given year; commonly referred to as the "100-year flood." 44 C.F.R. § 59.1
(1996).
40.

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, No.

186,

MANDATORY PURCHASE OF FLOOD

INSURANCE GUIDELINES 3 (1997). The official flood insurance rate map for a regular program
community delineates the Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA's) and applicable risk premium zones.
SFHA's are those areas within the floodplain that have a one percent chance of being flooded in any
given year (the 100-year floodplain). SFHA's are represented on the flood maps by darkly shaded
areas designated with the letter "A" or "V." FEMA uses engineering studies to determine the
delineation of these areas or zones subject to flooding. Id.
41. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 44 C.F.R. § 61.6 (1996). The regular program
flood insurance coverage is $250,000 for a residential building and $500,000 for non-residential or
small business. Contents coverage is up to $100,000 for residential and $500,000 for non-residential or
small business. Id.
42. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, How THE NFIP WORKS (1996). The most significant of the required ordinances is one which allows building permits for new residential construction
in flood hazard areas only for buildings to be constructed so that the lowest floor will be located above
the BFE. Non-residential buildings can be either elevated or flood proofed to that elevation. Id.
43. Id.
44. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 44 C.F.R. § 59.24 (1996); see also Letter from
Frank Begley, Chief of Natural & Technological Hazards Division, FEMA, to Gerald Ohlms, Presiding
Commissioner of St. Charles County (June 23, 1989). St. Charles County received such a visit in 1984
and the result was a letter dated February 23 of that year from Frank Begley, informing the County
that since they had been unwilling to deny requests for variances from the floodplain ordinances
(variances are specifically allowed within the regulations FEMA required the county to adopt), FEMA
had recommended that the Section 1362 project application submitted by the County in October, 1983,
which would have allowed FEMA to purchase existing flood prone structures, not be considered for
funding. Id. The County responded by a near moratorium on variances which then led to an outcry
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action is intimidating and leads to an outcry from citizens who may lose
flood insurance. In addition, to call the FEMA bureaucrats' bluff, small
local communities must go to court and spend large sums of money
while FEMA is represented by the capable and well-funded United States
Attorney .45
The FEMA regulation requiring that new structures must be elevated or made flood-proof to the BFE is also problematic. 46 Unfortunately,
the Flood Hazard Boundary Maps rarely contain flood elevations, and
communities are instructed to make use of any other available information that would indicate the BFE. If the applicant disagrees with the
determination of the local official, the burden is on the applicant to have
a survey done to establish the elevation. While large projects have little
problem getting the engineering they need, such information is not
readily available for the small farmer or individual homeowner.
The Flood Hazard Boundary Map will ultimately show a floodway
in which "encroachments, including fill, new construction, substantial improvements, and other developments" will be prohibited if they result in
"any increase" in flood levels.4 7 Once again, large projects can afford
the engineering costs to get a "no rise" certificate. The farmer, small
business, or single family homeowner who simply wants to enlarge a
48
structure in the floodway finds that the engineering cost is prohibitive.
C.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PROGRAM

In the wake of the 1993 flooding in the Midwest, Congress acted to
increase flood insurance coverage in an effort to reduce flood damage
and to reduce federal expenditures for disaster assistance to flood
from property owners who felt that the regulations were too inflexible. Id.
45. Interview with Steve Lauer, Director of Planning and Zoning for St. Charles County, in St.
Charles, Mo. (Feb. 1998).
46. See 44 C.F.R. § 60.3 (1996).
47. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(d) (1996). This section states that the floodway is based on the principle that
the area chosen for the regulatory floodway must be designed to carry the waters of the base flood,
without increasing the water surface elevation of that flood more than one foot at any point. Id.
48. A procedure is set out in 44 C.F.R. § 65.!2) ..,hich allows a community to permit encroachment in the floodway with the permission of all other affected jurisdictions. In practice, the applicable
standard seems to be any "significant increase" rather than "any increase." When bridges are built,
piers create an increase although it may be insignificant, and FEMA has not yet required all bridges
across our rivers to be suspension bridges from floodway line to floodway line. When the Highway
370 bridge was built in St. Charles, the Corps identified a rise which then impacted the height to which
the levee district could build its levee system. Letter from Frank Begley, Chief of Natural & Technological Hazards Division, FEMA, to Gerald Ohlms, Presiding Commissioner of St. Charles County
(June 23, 1989). The supervisors of the levee district were further amazed when the Casino Station
Gambling Casino was able to get a no-rise certificate, with regard to its "boats in a moat" project
where a large bath tub was built along the river bank and gambling boats were floated. According to
the Casino, the flows were not affected since the level of the ground on the landward side of the
structure was lowered. Also the area was deforested and paved, increasing the velocity of the water
to make up for any rise caused by the obstruction.
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damaged properties. 4 9 The law included measures to encourage the
public to buy flood insurance and to prohibit federally regulated lenders
from making, increasing, extending, or renewing any loan on floodplain
property unless flood insurance is purchased.50 Further, flood insurance
must be maintained during the term of the loan. 5 1 The 1994 National
Flood Insurance Reform Act indirectly. impacts regulated as well as
unregulated lender security because borrowers who have received certain
disaster assistance and then failed to obtain flood coverage are barred
from receiving future disaster aid. 5 2 The Act also implements a much
needed thirty-day waiting period, with a few exceptions, before the policy becomes effective. 5 3 The previous five-day waiting period allowed
individuals to wait until the water started to rise before they purchased
54
flood insurance.
All of these changes were necessary because of the multi-billion
dollar flood damage in the Midwest during the summer of 1993. The
low level of participation among eligible property owners kept disaster
relief payments high.55 Congress realized that more people needed to be
brought into the program and attempted to do so by creating more nega56
tive consequences for property owners who did not have insurance.
Concurrently, as the stakes were raised there was even more pressure on
the community to stay in the program.
V.

FEDERALISM QUESTIONS

Without flood insurance, very little development can take place in
the floodplain; without the local jurisdiction enacting the floodplain regulations no one is eligible for flood insurance. Early lawsuits challenging
the constitutionality of requiring the enactment of local regulation as a
49. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, No. 186, MANDATORY PURCHASE OFFLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES 3 (1997). The reasons for the Reform Act included the NFIP's low reserves as well
as low levels of participation among eligible property owners. It was estimated that fewer than 2 million of II million structures in the floodplain were covered by flood insurance. This was due to the
high cost of the insurance, lax enforcement by federally regulated lending institutions, and the fact that
homeowners often allowed their flood insurance to lapse. Congressional activity culminated with the
passage of H.R. 3474 which was enacted as Reform Act of 1994, Title V, Pub. L. No. 325, 108 Stat.
2160, 2255-87 (1994).
50. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, No. 186, MANDATORY PURC-ASE OF FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES 19 (1997).
51. Id.
52. Id. The flood insurance requirements apply to lenders or services that are not federally regulated and that do not sell loans to the Federal and National Mortgage Association and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) or other government sponsored
enterprises.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.at 3.
56. Id.
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condition for federal assistance, including flood insurance, were unsuccessful. 57 For instance, in Texas Landowners Rights Association v.
Harris, the court found that the NFIP did not violate the Fifth, Tenth, or
Fourteenth Amendments because it offered inducements for local
participation rather than simply mandating compliance. 5 8
A.

THE TENTH AMENDMENT

In Adolph v. FederalEmergency Management Agency, the plaintiffs
complained that the consequences of noncompliance were so severe that
59
the elected officials really had no alternative other than to comply.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' "in terrorem characterization of the
consequences" plaintiffs would have suffered had the parish council
declined participation, stating:
They draw an equally drastic, and similarly fallacious, portrait
of what might have happened if their community had decided
not to participate in the program and federal funds (FHA,
HUD, and VA) and programs (NFIP and such others as EPA
sewage facilities) had, thus, become unavailable in Plaquemines Parish. Contrary to plaintiffs' assertions, however, if the
parish had chosen not to participate in the program, conventional mortgages through federally-regulated institutions,
such as FDIC and FSLIC members, would still be available, for
example. 60
The Adolph court refused to accept plaintiffs argument that a more
"conservative" Supreme Court might be more likely to find a regulatory taking. 6 1
The Adolph court was not asked to consider how a more "conservative" Supreme Court might view the Tenth Amendment problems of the
NFIP, especially since loans by federally-regulated institutions, such as
57. See Adolph v. Federal Emergency Management Agency, 854 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1988); Texas
Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978).
rt.a. . of
st-'
.
. se
.
S
i
58. Harris.453 F. Supp. at 10290103. Plititca1 sudi, ens from
Housing and Urban Development challenging constitutionality of NFIP and the regulations implementing them. Id. at 1026-27. The court held that the general welfare clause of the Constitution does not
limit Congress, but actually gives an expansive grant of power enabling Congress to impose certain
principles of federalism upon the states. Id. at 1030. Due process arguments concerning "takings" by
the federal government were similarly denied. Id.
59. Adolph, 854 F.2d at 738.
60. Id. at 738.
61. The court found that First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), do
not significantly alter judicial review of alleged takings since the FEMA regulations do not deny the
owner economically viable use of their land. The state supreme courts have upheld local ordinances
more restrictive than the NFIP. Adolph, 854 F.2d at 737, 738.
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62
the FDIC and the FSLIC, are now required to have flood insurance.
Perhaps the recent amendments to the NFIP, along with the increased
willingness of the federal courts to hear Tenth Amendment claims, might
allow a reassessment of the Tenth Amendment argument that has been
previously rejected. 63
Principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment prohibit Congress, through FEMA, from coercing the states and their political
subdivisions into adopting its floodplain programs. Although Congress
has a variety of methods by which it may urge a state to adopt a legislative program, one fundamental principle applies to all of them: Congress may not coerce a state into doing so. 64 This limitation is based on
principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment, which
provides that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." 65
The Supreme Court clearly noted in New York v. United States that
Congress may encourage a state to adopt legislation to serve federal
objectives by simply attaching conditions to the receipt of federal funds
pursuant to its powers under the spending clause. 66 When properly
employed, these methods do not violate the Tenth Amendment because
they allow state and local governments to remain responsive to the local
electorate's preferences, and state and local officials to remain account67
able to the people.
The Court's concern in New York was Congress' improper use of
these methods to coerce states into doing its bidding. New York involved
a challenge to three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Act. 6 8 The Supreme Court upheld the first provision of the Act,
which provided monetary incentives to states to comply with a series of
deadlines for developing waste disposal plans, because it was an appropriate use of congressional power under the spending clause. 6 9 The
second provision, which provided for surcharges and access restrictions
at active disposal sites for waste from states that failed to meet certain
deadlines, was also upheld. 7 0 The Court found that Congress has the
62.

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY,

INSURANCE GUIDELINES 19 (1997).

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Harris,453 F. Supp. at 1030.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
U.S. Const. amend. X.
New York, 505 U.S. at 167.
Id. at 167-69.
Id. at 169-75.
Id.
Id. at 173-74.
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power, under the Commerce Clause, to authorize the states to discrimi71
nate against interstate commerce.
The third provision of the Act, a "take title" penalty, provided that
states that could not provide for disposal of their waste by 1996 had to
take ownership and possession of the waste from the private waste pro72
ducers or assume liability for all damages incurred by the producers.
The Court utilized the Tenth Amendment to strike down the third provision, demonstrating its clear concern with Congress presenting states
with "choices" that are, in fact, no choice at all. 73 The incentive offered
to state governments was the '"choice" between ownership of waste or
regulating according to the instructions of Congress. 74 But this type of
"choice" violated the Constitution because it, in fact, "offer[ed] a state
government no option other than that of implementing legislation enacted by Congress." 75 Theoretically, states had the option of accepting
ownership of the waste instead of implementing legislation for its disposal. 76 This was not really an option, however, because no state could
afford to let the waste remain unprocessed and risk being saddled with
liability for damages to those harmed by exposure to toxic substances. 77
Action by Congress requiring such a choice is inconsistent with the
Constitution's division of authority between federal and state governments because states "choosing" this alternative would be "commandeered" into the regulatory purposes of the federal government. 7 8
71. Id. at 173-75.
72. Id. at 152-55.
73. Id. at 175-77.
74. Id. at 173-79.
75. Id. at 177.
76. Id. at 176.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 176. In New York, the Supreme Court, concerned about the injury to state sovereignty that could result where Congress forces states into doing what the federal government is unwilling to
do itself, stated, the accountability of both state and federal officials is diminished because "it may be
state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while federal officials who devise the
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision." New
York, 505 U.S. at 167-69; see also, Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2382 (1997). In Printzv.
United States, the Supreme Court found that the Brady Act violated the principies of New York. Printz,
117 S. Ct. at 2384. The court found that:
by forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal
regulatory program, [m]embers of Congress can take credit for 'solving' problems
without having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes.
And even when the states are not forced to absorb the cost of implementing a federal
program, they are still put in the position of taking the blame for its burdensomeness and
for its defects. Under the present law, for example, it will be the CLEO and not some
federal official who stands between the gun purchaser and immediate possession of his
gun. And it will likely be the CLEO, not some federal official, who will be blamed for
any error (even when one in the designated federal data base) that causes a purchaser to
be mistakenly rejected.
Id. at 2382
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Other courts have recognized the specific limitation articulated in
New York. In Board of Natural Resources v. Brown,7 9 the Ninth Circuit
considered whether the Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage
Relief Act violated the Tenth Amendment by requiring the issuance of
regulations by state officials banning the export of timber from state and
federal lands within the state.8 0 In spite of the federal government's
argument that the Act did not compel the state to regulate since it could
simply refrain from selling timber, the court noted that the record
showed the state stood to lose $500 million over ten years if it halted
sales. 8 ' Applying New York, the court reasoned that the choice to halt
timber sales was nothing more than a "Hobson's choice," giving the
state the option of regulating according to federal law or losing substantial income.8 2 The court held that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment because there was no real choice.8 3
B. THE NFIP IN PRACTICE
While the original NFIP, on its face, may not appear to violate the
Tenth Amendment, the NFIP after the 1994 amendments making
non-compliance an even greater burden may violate the Tenth Amendment as it is applied. The coercive application of FEMA regulations can
be seen by looking at two specific episodes in the relationships between
FEMA, the State of Missouri, and its political subdivision, St. Charles
County. 8 4
The authority to enforce floodplain regulations through local city
or county ordinances is found under a city's or county's relevant
79. 992 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1993).
80. Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 938 (9th Cir. 1993).
81. Id. at 945.
82. Id. at 945-47.
83. Id. at 947. The FEMA regulations deal with land use which has traditionally been a local
issue. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-70 (1995) (stating that to uphold the statute at
issue, which made it a federal offense to possess a firearm in a school zone, would have required the
court to accept that "there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local"); see also, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the 1 1th
Amendment barred Congress from abrogating the state's sovereign immunity under the Commerce
Clause sending a clear message that there are limits on congressional authority).
84. In one instance, FEMA responded to a request from St. Charles County that they be at public
hearing on the density floodway by stating:
the county professional staff is well versed in all aspects of the proposed ordinance ...
and should be amply prepared to answer questions from members of the public ....
FEMA staff attendance at the Council meeting would neither provide additional
information nor facilitate the legislative process of the County Council. Therefore,
FEMA staff will not attend.
Letter from Stephen R. Harrell, Chief of Natural & Technological Hazards Division, FEMA, to
Eugene C. Schwendemann, County Executive, St. Charles County Council, Missouri (Mar. 4, 1993) (on
file with the St. Charles County Planning Dept).
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zoning statute. 85 The FEMA floodplain regulations apply to public, as
well as private property. 86 Thus, one political subdivision of the State of
Missouri (in this case, St. Charles County) was expected to enforce its
zoning regulations against another political subdivision (in this case, the
Consolidated North County Levee District). Even though the issue of
governmental immunity from zoning had been well established in
Missouri. 87
In response to this inconsistency, the Consolidated North County
Levee District asked their state senator to request an Attorney General's
Opinion on whether they were subject to the county's regulations. The
Opinion stated that local zoning ordinances, such as the floodplain
ordinances, were not applicable to public uses of property where a
political subdivision (in this case, the levee district) has the power to
acquire lands by the exercise of the power of eminent domain. 88
At about the same time, the Missouri Supreme Court decided the
case of St. Charles County v. Dardenne Realty Co.89 In Dardenne Realty, St. Charles County sued several private levee owners who had raised
their levees without first getting a floodplain permit. 90 The Supreme
85. Mo. REV. STAT. § 89.020 (1994) (authorizing city zoning); Mo. REV. STAT. § 64.010 (1994)
(authorizing county zoning); Mo. REV. STAT. § 49 (1994) (authorizing counties that do not wish to have
zoning to pass FEMA regulations).
86. 44 C.F.R. § 60.12(a) (1996). This section provides:
The state shall comply with the minimum floodplain management criteria set forth in
sections 60.3, 60.4 and 60.5. A state shall either (1) comply with the floodplain management requirements of all local communities participating in the program in which stateowned properties are located; or (2) establish and enforce floodplain management regulations which, at a minimum, satisfy the criteria set forth in sections 60.3, 60.4 and 60.5.
Id. In the case of Stolte v. Pena, No. 4:96-CV928GFG (D. Mo. 1996), the plaintiff city, in an attempt
to stop a highway project, refused to issue a floodplain permit for the project. The State of Missouri,
through Executive Order 97-09, established floodplain management regulations to be applied to state
projects with enforcement by the State Emergency Management Agency. The federal district court
found that the executive order, and its integrated floodplain management regulations for state-owned
development, were valid and authorized.
87. See City of St. Louis v. Bridgeton, 705 S.W.2d 524, 528 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the
city of St. Louis not subject to the zoning ordinaices of the City of Bridgeton when expanding its
airport); Applebaum v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1970) (holding that St. Louis County is
not required to comply with the zoning ordinances of municipalities in locating an incinerator and
landfill) St,. Lnuie
,
v. iC;, ^f ,,0 r
-3,c
6 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. i962) (en banc) (holding that
the city of Manchester was restricted in the selection of a sewage treatment plant by the zoning laws
of the County of St. Louis which operated under a constitutional charter); State v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d
882 (Mo. 1960) (holding that the city of Raytown was not subject to the zoning laws of Jackson County
in locating a sewage disposal plant); State v. Farris, 304 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. 1957) (en banc) (holding
that the city of Ladue could not restrict through its zoning ordinance the school board's power to
select, locate, and take in the domain property from a public school).
88. 117 Mo. ATr'v GEN. 1989. Withdrawn after the relevant statute was later amended.
89. St. Charles County v. Dardenne Realty Co., 771 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Mo. 1989) (en banc).
Among the defendants in the case was August A. Busch, III (the beer baron). This case was a good
example how a plaintiff with sufficient funds can often challenge the regulations on their face and as
applied. However, the expense of doing so is usually not justified for a small landowner seeking a
permit for a small project.
90. Id. at 829.
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Court of Missouri held that the state law authorizing county zoning
"shall not be exercised so as to impose regulations or to require permits
with respect to land used or to be used for the raising of crops." 9 1 The
court, therefore, found that land used for agricultural purposes is exempt
from county zoning requirements, including the county floodplain
order.9 2
The statute under which the Consolidated North County Levee
District was formed states that the owners of a majority of the acreage
"may form a levee district for the purpose of having such land and
other property reclaimed and protected from the effects of overflow and
other water for sanitary or 'agriculturalpurposes. "'93 Given the agricultural purposes of the levee district and in light of the agricultural exemption articulated in Dardenne Realty, a real question existed as to whether
a county can require a levee district to obtain a permit for construction
of a levee.
Given the uncertainty created by the Attorney General's Opinion
and the Dardenne Realty case, FEMA went to the Missouri Capitol
seeking a change in state law during the 1990 legislative session. 9 4 Their
bill, when debated on its merits, was soundly defeated in the Missouri
House due in large part to the efforts of the St. Charles County
delegation. 9 5 Before the 1992 legislative session, FEMA sent a letter to
every county and every legislator informing them that sixty counties
would be suspended from eligibility for the flood insurance program if
the legislature did not pass the legislation FEMA wanted. 96 With this
threat hanging over it, the legislature passed FEMA's bill after a fierce
debate in which even those who voted for the bill complained about
having a gun placed to their head by FEMA.97 Many legislators were
very disappointed that the state did not fight this action in the courts as
the state government had far more leverage and much greater financial
resources than the local jurisdictions.
If the State of Missouri could not withstand the pressure created by
the threat of suspension, no one would expect St. Charles County to fare
91. Id.
92. Id. at 831.
93. Mo. REV. STAT. § 245.015 (1986) (emphasis added).
94. H.B. 1706, 85th Mo. Leg., 2nd Sess. (1990).
95. Journal of the House, 85th Mo. Leg., 2nd Sess. (Apr. 25, 1990).
96. Letter from C.M. "Bud" Schauerte, Administrator of Federal Insurance, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, to Steven E. Ehlmann, Missouri State Representative, St. Charles, Missouri
(Sept. 13, 1990).
97. H.B. 72, 86th Mo. Leg., 1st Sess. (1991). The new statute stated, "Levee districts organized
pursuant to Chapter 245, RSMo ...
are subject to floodplain management regulations adopted by any
county." Mo. REV. STAT. § 49.600 (1986), as amended. The agricultural exemption was also
removed. Mo. REV. STAT. § 64.620 (1986), as amended.
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any better. On June 27, 1989, St. Charles County received a letter from
Frank Begley, FEMA Region VII, stating that during the 1986 flood, the
levees of the Consolidated North County Levee District on the Missouri
River had ruptured with the result that up to 95,000 cubic feet per
second of water spilled across the peninsula formed by St. Charles
County. 9 8 He added that "the floodway currently depicted on the
Missouri River does not account for the flows going across St. Charles
County," and gave the county the option of a new standard hydraulic
model floodway or to opt for what was called a "density floodway." 99
After a series of meetings, St. Charles County reluctantly agreed that
instead of a traditional floodway, they would allow a density floodway,
thus allowing people to develop up to an eighteen percent wider floodway, rather than the zero percent development required in a traditional
narrow floodway.100 FEMA required the density floodway ordinance to
contain language calling for no continuous fill. 101 This meant that the
Consolidated North County Levee District would not be allowed to raise
its levees since a levee would constitute continuous fill. To raise the
levees everywhere else would be worthless so long as the section within
the density floodway could not be raised and would always be the low
spot on the levee system.
The meetings held on this matter were contentious, with the farmers
wanting the county to reject the density floodway and take the matter to
court.102 The density floodway was supported by certain property
owners who were afraid that the county would lose its flood insurance
and disaster assistance should there be a flood. 103 While all members of
the county council felt that they were being coerced by FEMA, they did
98. Letter from Frank Begley, Action Regional Director of Federal Emergency Management
Agency, to Gerald OhIms, Presiding Commissioner of St. Charles County (June 23, 1989).
99. Id. The letter went on to say:
As you may surmise, the density floodway may address many of the problems which the
county may face. However, neither the standard floodway nor the density floodway
would allow for the encroachment presented by a levee. We are aware of the interests
by the levee districts in St. Charles County in developing a levee. However, given the
matter before us, we must work together to deter snch actions at thi ti-e.
Id.
100. ST. CHARLES COUNTY, MO., ORDINANCE No. 93-40 (1993).
101. Id.
102. Ralph Dummit, Insurance Maps for Flood Plain Assailed, OK'd, ST. CHARLES POST-DISPATCH,
Dec. 12, 1992, at 1. Dennis Miller, No Choice Left on FloodMaps, Says Commissioners, ST. CHARLES
JOURNAL,

Dec. 20, 1992, at1.

103. Id.
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vote five to two in favor of the density floodway. 104 The county council
members had no real choice; they could not leave the county without
05
assistance in the event of a flood.'
The regulatory scheme created by the NFIP violates the bedrock
principles of federalism and the Tenth Amendment in the same way as
the "take title" provision did in the New York case. 106 Although the
NFIP provisions give Missouri and its political subdivisions a theoretical
choice as to whether to adopt local ordinances, the choice is entirely
illusory. If St. Charles County or the State of Missouri chooses not to
regulate according to Congress' wishes, they would expose their people
to having no flood insurance, disqualify them from any federally
regulated loans, and disqualify both their citizens and themselves from
any federal aid in time of flood. 107 Just as in New York, where states had
to "take title" to all the waste, Missouri and its subdivisions would have
to "take title" to every problem associated with flooding at a cost far
in excess of that seen as a "Hobson's choice" in Board of Natural
8
Resources.10
New York made clear that Congress may only influence state policy
choices through means "short of outright coercion."109 If federal law
"crosse[s] the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion" it is
"unconstitutionally coercive."11 0 Where, as here, the FEMA regulatory
scheme diminishes political accountability because "due to federal
104. ST. CHARLES COUNTY, MO., ORDINANCE No. 93-100 (1993). Council Chair, Carl Bearden,
wrote a letter to FEMA Region VII, on June 25, 1993, stating, "We are extremely disappointed with
the appearance of your agency using the threat of rescinding flood insurance as leverage towards
making St. Charles County a backwater basin." Letter from Carl Bearden, Council Chair, to Frank
Begley, Action Regional Director of Federal Emergency Management Agency (June 25, 1993).
105. On May 18, 1993, FEMA sent a letter to Eugene Schwendemann of St. Charles County,
threatening suspension on June 16, 1993, if the ordinance was not passed. Less than a month after
Councilman Bearden's letter dated June 25, 1993, the 1993 flood was well under way. The 1993 flood
was the most devastating flood in the history of St. Charles County, and the county and individuals
received hundreds of millions of dollars in federal aid as a result of the flood. One cannot imagine
what would have happened to the county and its inhabitants without this federal assistance.
106. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169-75 (1992).
107. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GovERNoR's TASK FORCE ON FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT
6 (July 1994). One year after the flood of 1993, 37,000 Missourians had applied for disaster assistance from FEMA and $26.25 million had been distributed for individual and family grant assistance.
Public assistance to local governments totaled $82.1 million.
108. New York, at 505 U.S. at 169-75; Board of Natural Resources v. Brown, 992 F.2d 937, 945
(9th Cir. 1993).
109. New York, 505 U.S. at 165-67 (emphasis added).
110. Id.
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coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the
views of the local electorate," it is unconstitutional. 1 1
VI. EQUAL PROTECTION QUESTIONS
While the FEMA Floodplain Regulations certainly appear fair on
their face, the experiences of St. Charles County show that they can be
unfair as applied. While no one would want to see new federal or state
bureaucracies, the fact that FEMA uses existing local bureaucracies to
enforce the regulations is also one of the program's greatest weaknesses.
The Consolidated North County Levee District is an agricultural levee
district where ninety-five percent of the land is used for agriculture. It is
located within a fast developing suburban county which has had county
planning and zoning for nearly thirty years with an experienced and
professional staff to enforce every FEMA regulation. This is in contrast
to rural Missouri counties. Most do not have planning and zoning, and
therefore, no building department, making enforcement in those counties lax.11 2 It is extremely difficult to explain to the people in St. Charles
County why levees cannot be built because of regulations, when those
same regulations never seem to be a problem for their cousins living in
other counties. While this uneven enforcement is certainly unfair, it
probably does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 1 13
111. Id. The essential question under the 10th Amendment is whether a Congressional mandate
is backed up by an enforcement mechanism that is sufficiently coercive to rob the state of all reasonable choice in the matter. See, e.g., Kentucky Div. v. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n, 20 F.3d 1406, 1415
(6th Cir. 1994) (holding no 10th Amendment violation where "the State remains free to ignore ... a
request"); Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 811 F. Supp. 1300, 1321 (N.D. Il1.
1992) (holding that statute did not violate the 10th Amendment because "[n]o penalty is imposed if a
state refuses" to develop regulations in accordance with the statute). The FEMA regulations are
intended to be that kind of enforcement mechanism. The question is whether the FEMA regulations
have "crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion." New York, 505 U.S. at 175-77.
The severity of nonparticipation ineluctably leads to the point where the State "may not decline to
administer the federal program." Id. at 2429; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-212
(1987) (holding no constitutional violation where only five percent of funds available under a federal
grant would be withheld).
112. Bills have been filed by the author in the Missouri General Assembly in the last five years
which would establish the State Emergency Management Agency a the permitting authority for all
counties and cities which do not have planning and zoning. This would ensure uniform enforcement
of regulations throughout the state. To date, efforts have been unsuccessful to pass a bill.
113. Memorandum concerning Unequal Enforcement of Law-Equal Protection, from Margaret
J. Toalson, Missouri Senate, Division of Research, to Senator Steve Ehlmann (January 29, 1998) (on
file with the author). There seems to be no cases addressing the unequal enforcement of federally
influenced ordinances by political subdivisions. There have been cases challenging selective enforcement of state laws and local ordinances. Courts appear to have used a similar analysis as for criminal
defendants. See, e.g., Fair v. City of Galveston, 915 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Barber v. Municipality of Anchorage, 776 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1989); Ardt v. Department of Professional Regulation,
578 N.E.2d 128 (I11.
Ct. App. 1991). There are provisions governing selective enforcement of laws as
applied in criminal cases. So long as the statue is rationally based, intentional selectivity does not
violate equal protection rights. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir. 1973). If the selective enforcement is based on race, religion, or the intent to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights,
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Another potential equal protection problem arose after the 1993
flood, when thousands of structures in St. Charles County were condemned pursuant to the "51% rule." This rule requires that any structure requiring substantial improvement, which equals or exceeds 50% of
the market value of the structure before the start of construction, could
not be rebuilt unless raised above the 100-year flood level. 1 14 In Region
VII of FEMA, all of the jurisdictions were instructed to use fair market
value in determining whether the structure was damaged at least 50%.
Meanwhile, across the Mississippi River from St. Charles County, in the
State of Illinois, which is in FEMA Region V, replacement cost was used
to enforce the "5 1% rule." 1 15 When this was brought to the attention of
FEMA by the local Congressman, FEMA was forced to back down in
Region VII and allow jurisdictions to use replacement cost in figuring
the "51% rule." This meant that many structures which had previously
been condemned now could be rehabilitated and reoccupied.l 6 In some
communities it meant the difference between almost every structure
having to be torn down and almost every structure being eligible for
rehabitation. 117
(i.e., improper motives) then an equal protection problem occurs. United States v. Salazar, 720 F.2d
1482 (10th Cir. 1983). Such intentional discrimination must be as to a particular class, not the individual. Porter v. Board of Educ., 837 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Il. 1993). Failure to prosecute others under
the same law does not establish selective enforcement unless the prosecution was based on
unjustifiable standard (arbitrary, illegal, etc.). King v. Pimentel, 890 P.2d 1217 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).
114. 44 C.F.R. §§ 59.1, 60.3 (1996).
Substantial improvement means any reconstruction, rehabilitation, addition or other
improvement of a structure, the cost of which equals or exceeds 50 percent of the
market value of the structure before the start of construction of the improvement. This
term includes structures which have incurred "substantial damage," regardless of the
actual repair work performed.
Id.
115. Ralph Dummit, Insurance Maps for Flood Plain Assailed, Ok'd, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
Dec. 15, 1992, at IA; see also, Dennis Miller, Two Legislators Seek to Waive Floodplain Rule, ST.
CHARLES JOURNAL, Aug. 18, 1993, at IA, 15A; William Freivogel, Ruling Aid Rebuilding in Flood Plain,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 3, 1993, at IA, 12A.
116. The cost to build a new structure is almost always more than the fair market value of the
structure. By using replacement cost, more homeowners had the option of rebuilding their houses.
117. In West Alton, Missouri, almost every structure received a red tag from St. Charles County
indicating it was condemned and would have to be tom down. At the same time, Portage des Sioux, an
incorporated city with its own FEMA ordinances, condemned no one. The people of West Alton
eventually got relief through the change to replacement costs and the buy-out program, but the
experience left a bad taste in their mouths. After a second flood in 1995, West Alton incorporated as
a fourth-class city so that they would be able to have local, rather than county, enforcement of FEMA
floodplain regulations.
While FEMA corrected this inconsistency in the aftermath of the flood, Region VII has since
gone back to using the stricter market value standard where large numbers of structures are no longer
involved. One has to wonder at what point this type of uneven enforcement violates the Equal Protection Clause. People are being deprived of their property and should be entitled to equal treatment.
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VII. OTHER PROBLEMS
A. THE PURE HYDROLOGY MODEL
The FEMA Floodplain Regulations, as applied, can also be arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable for several additional reasons. When told
that the FEMA regulations kept them from improving their levees, the
board of the Consolidated North County Levee District hired a consultant and had a series of meetings with FEMA and the Corps of Engineers. The Corps of Engineers eventually did a study to determine the
extent that levees could be raised in St. Charles without causing induced
flooding elsewhere. 118 It was determined that the primary problem was a
very old railroad bridge built in the West Alton area parallel to the
Highway 67 bridge.l" 9 This bridge did not provide an adequate opening
to convey the 100-year flood with only a one-foot rise, the requirement
of a floodway.120 Adding too much additional height to the existing
levees in the floodway would combine with this restriction to cause
induced flooding elsewhere. 121 The Corps did eventually conclude that
a twenty-year level of protection with no "freeboard"1 22 could be built
so long as the levee district met certain requirements, including
persuading St. Charles and St. Louis counties to make certain floodway
adjustments. 12 3
When FEMA required the density floodway, the strategy of floodway adjustment had to be abandoned by the Consolidated North County
Levee District. Even before this, FEMA was taking the position that the
change in floodways had to be approved not only by St. Louis and St.
Charles counties, but by every jurisdiction in any way impacted. Since
this meant about ten other jurisdictions, it became an impossible task. 12 4
What appears on paper as a reasonable procedure for amending the
floodway, becomes in practice, a nearly impossible task.
118. See UNITED STATES CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 24, at 4.
119. Id. at 2-3.
120. 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(d)(3) (i996).
121. See UNITED STATES CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 24, at 4.
122. "Freeboard" means a factor of safety, usually expressed in feet, above a flood level for
purposes of floodplain management.
123. See UNITED STATES CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 24, at 9. The study required the Consolidated North County Levee District to do the following: (1) move the existing levees back to the embankment of the railroad bridge mentioned above; (2) get St. Louis County to adjust its floodway line
so that the floodway would include Pelican Island; and (3) get St. Louis County to agree to certain
adjustments in the floodway lines in St. Louis County. Id.
124. Meeting held in St. Louis on Dec. 13, 1995, at Senator Bond's office. Most jurisdiction were
only slightly impacted, but it would be nearly impossible to get all the city councils to act on a proposal
that, while it does them no harm, it also does them no good.
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The FEMA regulations are based on a pure hydrology model which
does not take into consideration the prior history and present land uses
of any particular floodplain area. 125 While this regulatory program
allows a federal veto on all land use decisions in the forty-three percent
of St. Charles County that is floodplain, it does not take into consideration any of the traditional land use criteria, including highest and best
use of the land. 12 6 There are floodplain areas in St. Charles County with
close to a 100-year level of protection that have only agricultural uses
and no residents. The Consolidated North County Levee District, with
over 30,000 acres, more than 3,000 residents before 1993, a Union
Electric generating plant providing electricity for the entire area, an
assembly plant for McDonnell Douglas, and an historic community like
27
Portage des Sioux, has an effective eleven-year level of protection.1
Yet, based on the pure hydrology model contained in the overly broad
FEMA regulations, that eleven-year levee cannot be raised.
B.

BLANKET PRICING OF INSURANCE

While not everyone in the floodplain is equally flood-prone, the
premium for the flood insurance coverage is fixed at a below cost rate,
unrelated to the risk involved.1 28 The premiums go into a fund from
which the claims are paid and to which the Federal Treasury supplements, to the extent needed.1 29 This blanket pricing of flood insurance is another irrational aspect of the NFIP. Club houses on the river
bank, converted to low-income housing that are frequently flooded,
may get the same rate as 100 year old farm houses built on a ridge that
may have been flooded only once during their existence.1 30
The entire floodplain management scheme was intended to discourage development in the floodplain areas, to decrease the number of
people living in those areas, and decrease disaster payments.131 Like
125. See 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(a)(3) (1996).
126. PHILLIP LANGDON, A BErrTER PLACE TO LIVE 202 (1994).
127. See UNITED STATES CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 24, at 9.
128. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, No. 186, MANDATORY PURCHASE OF FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES 5 (1997).
129. See National Flood Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-27 (1994).
130. The St. Charles County Planning and Zoning Department has a map showing that flood insurance claims, especially repeat claims, are on structures along the rivers, including trailer courts, not
farm homes.
131. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, No. 186, MANDATORY PURCHASE OF FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES 1 (1997). The reasons for the Reform Act included the NFIP's low reserves as well
as low level of participation among eligible property owners. It was estimated that fewer than two
million of II million structures in the floodplain were covered by flood insurance. This was due to the
high cost of the insurance, lax enforcement by federally regulated lending institutions, and the fact that
homeowners often allowed their flood insurance to lapse. Congressional activity culminated with the
passage of H.R. 3474 which was enacted as Reform Act of 1994, Title V. Pub. L. 325, 108 Stat. 2160,
2255-87 (1994).
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many federal programs, though well intentioned, it has had unforeseen
consequences.
Before the federal government got into floodplain management,
there were three main groups of people in the floodplain. The first
group were residents of old, established towns such as Portage des Sioux.
The town was founded in the late eighteenth century, built on the highest
ground in the area and until 1993, had never been flooded.1 3 2 When
Portage des Sioux was flooded, it was subject to the same regulations as
133
repeat offenders who had already made repeated claims.
Among the second group in the St. Charles County floodplain were
the residents living in club houses along Alton Lake that had been built
after the Alton Dam was completed in the early 1930s. Knowing they
would be flooded often, owners built the houses of cheap materials, often
elevating them so as to minimize flood damage. No one would spend
the amount of money required to turn them into permanent residences
when they could not be insured against flooding. When the federal
government decided to insure these club house structures, people quit
using them as club houses. The club houses were rented out and became
low income housing.1 34 The net result in St. Charles County was to have
additional people moving into floodplain areas. 135 Also among the second group were the residents living in mobile home parks. Before flood
insurance, one must assume that people moved mobile homes into the
floodplain with the intent to move them out when a flood appeared imminent. After flood insurance, people made no effort to move; they simply
36
collect on their damaged trailer which is almost always a total loss.1
The third group in the floodplain were the farmers who found it
necessary to have their farm buildings and homes close to their fields in
order to make a decent living upon the fertile land of the floodplain.
The farmers built their homes on ridges and assumed they would be
flooded only every fifty years or so. 137
132. PAUL R. HOLLRAH, A HISTORY OF ST. CHARLES COUNTY (1997).
133. See 44 C.F.R. § 59.1 (1996). However there is an exception to the ban on "substantial
134. Interview with Ray Machens, President of the Consolidated North County Levee District, in
St. Charles, Mo. (Jan. 12, 1998).
135. Population of Portage des Sioux Township: 1900-n/a; 1910-2,202; 1920-2,119; 19302,151; 1940-2,127; 1950-1,985; 1960-2,974; 1970-3,869; 1980-9,114. U.S. DEPT. OFCOMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (census tables for each general population census since 1910). Portage
Township combined with Rivers Township around 1990. It was no longer a township after late 1980s.
Portage des Sioux, the town, is now listed under Rivers Township.
136. After the 1986 flood, Congress actually relaxed the standards applied to mobile homes. 44
C.F.R. § 60.6 (1996).
137. Interview with Ray Machens, President of the Consolidated North County Levee District, in
St. Charles, Mo. (Jan. 12, 1998).
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While farmers never asked for federal intervention, they were now
faced with extensive land use regulations which greatly devalued their
property and hampered their ability to farm. The most recent example
of this was the doing away with the "agricultural exemption" by the
Missouri General Assembly in 1990.138 This change, at the insistence of
FEMA, meant that farmers now would have to elevate not only their
homes but also their farm structures in the event that they were more
than fifty percent destroyed by any flood.139 To justify increased regulation, FEMA pointed out that St. Charles County was among the highest
in total floodplain claims of all counties in the nation.140 In fact, the vast
majority of the claims were the old club houses along the rivers. Yet,
every time FEMA tightens its regulations, farmers are the most affected.
It is the farmers who want better levee protection and larger homes, but
are thwarted by the regulation. The club houses are mostly outside the
levees. Furthermore, most residents of mobile home parks did not support the levee district because many actually made money on the
floods. 141
Given the above, it is not surprising that people would object to the
fact that the flood insurance program treats all the various groups listed
above in the same way. This means that farmers or townspeople who
had their house flooded for the first time in 1993 are treated the same as
the person whose home is subject to flood damage every four or five
years.1 42 While the latter is collecting frequent checks from the federal
government, the former feels the brunt of the regulations. This was
never more apparent than during the 1993 flood, when people whose
homes were never previously flooded were being forced out or forced to
rebuild above the 100-year floodplain. The overall result is that the
flood insurance program has failed to achieve its purposes, and has in
the process, created a great deal of animosity against the federal government's intervention in land use decisions in St. Charles County.1 43
138. Mo. REV. STAT. § 64.620 (1986).
139. 44 C.F.R. § 60.6 (1996). The 1994 amendment now allows for variances for agricultural
structure.
140. Phil Linsalata, The Floodof '93-Uncle Sam's Left Hand, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 4,
1994, at lB.
141. My favorite story is of the lady who came out of her trailer to encourage the farmers sandbagging on the levee. She asked them to hold back the flood one more day-until the five-day waiting
period on her flood insurance had run and the policy would be in effect. Support of mobile home
owners was not essential to the levee district since voting is based on the number of acres owned. See
Mo. REV. STAT. § 245.070 (1990).
142. Dennis Miller, Two Legislators Seek to Waive FloodplainRule, ST. CHARLES JOURNAL, Aug.
18, 1993, at IA, 15A.
143. Kathleen Best & Phil Linsalata, In the End Everyone Pays, ST. Louis PoST-DIsPATCH, Nov.
21, 1993, at 3A; Phil Linsalata, Want to Buy Flood Insurance? Good Luck, ST. Louis POST- DISPATCH,
Nov. 21, 1993, at 4A; Kathleen Best & Phil Lansalata, Going Back for More, ST. Louis POST-DIsPATCH,
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The NFIP should be amended to take into consideration repetitive
loss as a factor in determining whether structures will be rebuilt or tom
down.144 Structures that have been the beneficiaries of numerous claims
and which the federal government has subsidized for years should not
continue to be rebuilt and become a further burden on the Federal
Treasury. However, the people who have a good reason to live in the
floodplain, or who had made few claims until the flood of 1993, should
not be penalized because the 500-year flood happened to come during
their lifetime.14 5 A FEMA publication states:
Prior to 1968, the Federal Government attempted to control
coastal and riverine flooding on a national scale through
re-channeling, using dams and levees to restrict the flow of
But the increasing costs of these projects and high
waters ....
annual totals of flood-related damage influenced the Government to explore the possibility of decreasing disaster relief
payments through flood insurance. 146
The residents of the Consolidated North County Levee District had
never benefitted from the government's largess on the L-15 project.
Now, over the last twenty-five years, they have seen constantly increasing
disaster and relief payments every time there is a flood.
C. FEDERAL RELIEF
Meanwhile, the Great Flood of 1993 did over $2 million worth of
damage to the levee system. 147 To gain the twenty percent cost share,
another bond issue was necessary. Due to the efforts of the board of
supervisors, the levee district was the second levee to be completely fixed
after the 1993 flood. The flood of 1994 came within inches of topping
the levee. Sandbagging efforts by the levee district held the levee and
only minor damage was done in 1994 saving the Federal Treasury
Nov. 21, 1993, at 5A.
144. The 1994 Reforms do treat repetitive losses a little differently.
145. Many of the club houses are already on property owned by the Corps of Engineers, and the
Corps' leases specifically precludes them from making flood disaster applications. However, no one
enforces this matter to the detriment of the federal budget. If there is a buy-out of any of the land
protected by the levee district, it is absolutely necessary that the legislation authorizing such buy-out
allow and require that the government also pay off the assessments against the property they are
buying out. There is precedent for this in the State of Missouri. When the Conservation Commission
bought up property in the district for a wildlife sanctuary, they agreed to make payments in lieu of
taxes on the ground purchased. If the federal government buys this land or provides money for local
entities to purchase it, it will, of course, become tax exempt. Any effort to collect the taxes owed from
the previous owner will be difficult, as the people who are bought out are likely to leave the area. In
this respect, the program had exactly the opposite effect intended.
146. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, No. 186, MANDATORY PURCHASE OF FLOOD INSURANCE GUIDELINES 3 (1997).
147. Interview with Ray Machens, President of the Consolidated North County Levee District, in
St. Charles, Mo. (Jan. 12, 1998).
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millions of dollars (a service for which they received no thanks).1 48
1995 was another story. The 1995 flood took its toll on the levee, once
again forcing the district to come up with funds to repair the levee
system.149 The levee system protects 30,000 acres of some of the best
farm land in Missouri. Without the efforts of the levee district board
these three floods, over a nine-year period, would have totally devastated
this area and destroyed its economic productivity.
After repairing the damage from the 1995 flood, the board of
supervisors again turned its attention to reducing the regulatory burden
that condemned it to forever having an effective eleven-year level of
protection; a situation which they felt would doom the economic future
of the area. The board decided it would take an act of Congress to fix
this problem, and they began working with Congressman Jim Talent
(R-Chesterfield) and Senator Christopher "Kit" Bond (R-Missouri) to
effect a change in the law.
In the fall of 1996, the federal statute was changed to allow a
maximum twenty-year level of protection on both sides of the Missouri
River from St. Charles to the confluence with the Mississippi River. 150 In
addition, the board was able to get the Corps of Engineers to initiate a
148. In fact, in October 10, 1995, Jerry B. Uhlmann, Director of the Missouri State Emergency
Management Agency, and David Shorr, Director of the Missouri Department of Natural Resources,
signed a Memorandum of Agreement for "Preservation of the Leveed Floodways on the Upper
Mississippi and Lower Missouri Rivers," with representatives of Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota,
Nebraska, and Wisconsin. Among other things, it was agreed that "flood fighting should not be
permitted to raise the effective level of levee protection during a flood if such actions will increase
flood damages elsewhere." FEMA immediately called upon each state to "amend or otherwise
modify existing administrative or operating plans to reflect the principles of this agreement." Letter
from Warren Pugh, Division Director, Response and Recovery Division, to Jerry B. Uhlmann,
Director, State Emergency Management Agency, (Dec. 12, 1995). Levee districts became alarmed.
DrainageDistrictOfficials Want Levee Policy Explained, THE QuINcY HERALD-WHIo, Dec. 17, 1995.
A resolution was passed against the agreement in the Missouri Senate and the State Emergency
Management Agency immediately reaffirmed its prior sandbagging policy. Letter from Jerry B.
Uhlmann, Director, State Emergency Management Agency, to Warren Pugh, Division Director,
Response and Recovery Division (Feb. 9, 1996).
149. North County Levee District was forced to come up with over $1 million to fix flooddamaged levees over a nine-year period.
150. S. 640, 104th Cong. § 547 (1996).
(a) In General.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of law or regulation, no county
located at the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers or community located in
any county located at the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers shall have its
participation in the national flood insurance program established under chapter I of the
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 4011 et seq.) suspended, revoked, or
otherwise affected solely due to that county or community permitting the raising of
levees by any public-sponsored levee district, along an alignment approved by the circuit
court of such county, to a level sufficient to contain a 20 year flood.
(b) Permits.-- The permit issued under section 404 of the Federal Water Control Pollution
Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1344) number P-1972, authorizing the reshaping and realignment
of an existing levee, shall be considered adequate to allow the raising of levees under
subsection (a).
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study to determine if federal funds could be used to build a twenty-year
agricultural levee.1 51
VIII. CONCLUSION
In his book, Rising Tide, The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and
How it Changed America, John M. Barry makes the following observation about the federal efforts to prevent flooding on the lower Mississippi River: "To control the Mississippi River-not simply to find a
modus vivendi with it, but to control it, to dictate to it, to make it then
conform-is a mighty task. It requires more than confidence; it requires
52
hubris. It was the perfect task for the nineteenth century."1
The events of the twentieth century have made us lose some of our
faith in the efficiency of scientific progress delivered by engineers. In
1968, apparently not all in Congress had lost their faith in the possibility
of social progress delivered by the social engineer.153 For, to control the
people of the Mississippi River floodplain, not simply to find a modus
vivendi with them, but to control them, to dictate to them, to make them
conform, is also a mighty task. It requires more than confidence, it also
requires hubris. It was the perfect task for the twentieth century. As the
NFIP was a centerpiece of the liberal ascendancy of the 1960s, the
response by the people of St. Charles County was symptomatic of the
conservative ascendancy of the 1980s.
People inhabiting the floodplains of St. Charles County moved
there in the nineteenth century and cleared the land, drained the swamps,
and built levees to guard against the ravages of nature. 154 There was no
federal program to insure them against loss, and as a result, they were
very careful where they built their homes. Most made wise economic
decisions, but some did not. Later, to deal with those who did not, the
151. Recent developments in Washington have increased the chances for St. Charles County to
improve its levee protection. The Energy and Water Appropriations Bill contains $250,000 for the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to study a possible raise of the levees between St. Charles and the
confluence with the Mississippi River. Should the Corps recommend the project, and the federal
government fund it, there is language in the Water Resources Development Act which eliminates
some of the bureaucratic impediments to the project. The area in question has an effective level of
protection of II years according to the Corps of Engineers. Nevertheless, the area has experienced
three floods in the last 10 years. Efforts to achieve a 20-year level of protection with two-foot freeboard had to be scrapped because of induced flooding elsewhere. The 20-year plan was the highest
level allowed by a Corps of Engineers' study completed several years ago. While the 20-year level is
not what the Consolidated North County Levee District had sought, making this a federally sponsored
levee, will relieve the local levee district of the burden of paying 20% of the cost of repair.
152. JOHN M. BARRY, R isING T IDE-THE GREAT MissIssIPPi FLOOD OF 1927 AND How IT C HANGED
AMERICA 21 (1997).
153. The 90th Congress had passed other ambitious social programs such as the Consumer Credit
Protection Act and Fair Housing Act, all part of Lindon Johnson's "Great Society."
154. PAUL R. HoLLRAH, A HISTORY OF ST. CHARLES COUNTY (1997).
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federal government imposed itself into the situation by implementing an
ambitious attempt at social engineering-the NFIP. Even if well intentioned, federal efforts may have actually made the problem worse by
granting a federal subsidy in the form of federal flood insurance to
those who wished to live in the floodplain.
The way in which the regulations were promulgated and enforced
has created very negative feelings by the local people against the federal
government. Whether the regulatory scheme violates the Tenth Amendment or not, it certainly has made local inhabitants cynical as they see
their local elected officials, constrained with impossible choices, forcing
them to cede the property rights of their constituents in return for
federal government largess. As the inhabitants see their property rights
eroded, they see neighbors upriver largely unaffected in jurisdictions
which have adopted identical regulations. They see a system in which hydrology rather than the interests of the citizens is paramount. People are
also discouraged by the one-size-fits-all approach of the federal government. They see a system which fails to appreciate the positive role that
levees have and will continue to play in floodplain management.1 55
We have probably gone too far to return to a laissez-faire approach
to the floodplain. People should be willing to accept reasonable regulations in return for all of the federal benefits. However, the acceptance
should be freely given, not coerced, and the regulations should be
reasonable, not arbitrary.

155. The Corps of Engineers concluded after the 1993 flood that, "floodplains are best managed
through a combination of structural and non-structural measures that fully recognize the inherent risk
of occupying flood hazard areas." EXECUTIVES UMMARY, U.S. ARMY C ORPS OF ENGINEERS FLOOD MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT OF THE UPPER Mississippi RIVER AND LOWER MISSOURI RIVERS AND TRIBUTARIES
(June 1995).
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